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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Melonie Dawn Smith appeals from her conviction for first-degree murder and
destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence, following a jury trial, related to the shooting
death of a man at her house. On appeal, Ms. Smith asserts: (1) the district court erred when it
denied her motion to suppress, because an exception to the warrant requirement does not justify
the warrantless search of her house after officers froze the scene, and the inevitable discovery
doctrine does not prevent the suppression of the evidence gained from the unlawful search;
(2) the district court abused its discretion by allowing hearsay testimony of two witnesses to be
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted; and (3) several of her rights were violated,
amounting to fundamental error, when a video showing her repeatedly refusing to consent to a
search of her house was admitted at trial and the prosecutor argued the jurors should infer her
guilt based on those refusals.
Because these errors, either independently or cumulatively, deprived Ms. Smith of her
right to a fair trial, this Court should vacate her judgment of conviction and remand this case for
further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On a cold February evening, Detective Herbert, Detective Chapa, and Sergeant Phillips
of the Bingham County Sheriffs Office stood on the deck outside the front door of Ms. Smith's
house, knocked on the door, and announced their presence. (See R., pp.268, 273-74.) Ms. Smith
came out of the front door and closed it behind her. (R., p.274.) The officers told her there were
reports that someone had been shot and needed medical attention, but Ms. Smith told them no
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one inside needed medical attention. (See R., p.275.) Ms. Smith refused to let the officers go
inside and look, telling them to get a warrant instead. (See R., p.275.)
Detective Herbert told Ms. Smith the scene would be sealed and she and her mother,
Bettie Duke, would have to leave the residence if she continued to refuse the officers entry.
(R., p.276.) Ms. Smith stated nobody else was in the house. (R., p.276.) She also stated that
"Kevin" had hurt "David," by shooting David in the leg in the driveway, but both men had left.
(See R., p.277.) Ms. Smith denied David was dead inside the house. (R., p.277.)

Ms. Smith again told the officers to get a warrant, and the officers repeated that they
would seize the home in anticipation of a search warrant. (See R., pp.278-79.) As Ms. Smith
protested, Sergeant Phillips reminded the officers that a gun was reportedly next to the front
door. (See R., p.278.) Detective Herbert told Ms. Smith both she and her mother would need to
leave the premises, and if they re-entered the house, an officer would have to accompany them.
(See R., p.279.) The officers eventually handcuffed Ms. Smith as she was standing in front of

the door. (R., p.279.)
The officers' actions on the deck were based on a report made by Guy Lopez earlier that
evening, in which he told sheriff's deputies that Ms. Smith had told him she had, several days
before, killed a man by shooting him in the head with a .45-70 rifle. (See R., pp.269, 271.)
Another man named "Kevin" had shot the man twice in the legs outside her house. (R., p.269.)
Mr. Lopez stated Ms. Smith asked him to help her move the body, and she also wanted to bum
her couch, which had brain material on it, with the body. (See R., p.270.) He stated he had seen
the man's body wrapped in plastic, brain matter in the house, blood and human debris on the
wall, and part of the skull and other bones in the wood-burning stove. (See R., p.271.)
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Mr. Lopez told the deputies his observations at the house happened an hour before he
contacted the police. (See R., p.271.) He also stated Ms. Smith had tried to clean the blood
matter from the walls. (See R., p.271.) Mr. Lopez stated guns other than the .45-70 could be
found in the house, including a gun next to the front door, and Ms. Smith had been making
methamphetamine in an outbuilding on the property. (See R., p.273.) He also noted Ms. Smith
had several vehicles, which she kept parked in the driveway outside the house. (See R., p.272.)
Chief Deputy Jorgensen was skeptical because Mr. Lopez had made fantastic reports to
police before. (See R., p.273.) Sergeant Howell also mentioned that a search warrant would be
necessary. (See R., p.272.) However, Sergeant Phillips was concerned that Ms. Smith would
destroy additional evidence, given Mr. Lopez's report that she tried to bum parts of the body in
the wood-burning stove. (See R., p.273.) As a result, officers began surveilling Ms. Smith's
house, while Sergeant Phillips and others went to make contact with Ms. Smith without securing
a search warrant. (See R., p.273.) There were five vehicles in the driveway when they arrived.
(See R., p.273.)

After the officers handcuffed Ms. Smith, Ms. Duke came to the front door, confirmed that
nobody else was in the house, and told the officers she was going to get a coat from the house.
(See R., p.279.) The officers told Ms. Duke that if she went inside, an officer would have to

accompany her. (See R., p.280.) Ms. Duke stated she was too shaky to stand in the doorway,
and the officers followed her inside the house. (See R., p.280.) While one officer remained with
Ms. Duke as she sat in the main room, the two other officers went through the rest of the house
with guns drawn, and found a large bag in the laundry room. (See R., pp.280-81.) One officer
felt the end of the bag and identified two feet. (See R., p.281.) The officers did not open or
move the bag. (See R., p.281.) However, the officers relayed their findings to the officer who
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was still preparing the application for the search warrant. (See Motion to Suppress Hearing
State's Ex. 10, pp.3-4.)
Meanwhile, Ms. Duke told the officers that Kevin Day had shot David. (See R., p.281.)
Officers took Ms. Duke to the Sheriffs Office. (See R., pp.281-82.) The search warrant was
issued and served on Ms. Smith's house about six hours after Mr. Lopez contacted the police.
(See R., p.282.) The body wrapped in plastic found in the house was later identified as that of

David Davis. (See R., pp.28-29.)
The State charged Ms. Smith with murder in the first degree and destruction, alteration or
concealment of evidence. (R., pp.140-41.) Ms. Smith moved to suppress the evidence found in
her house, asserting the search of her house was in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution,1 because the officers' entry into the house was
without a warrant, without consent, and not justified by exigent circumstances. (See R., pp.15962).
After conducting a hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court determined
exigent circumstances regarding the preservation of evidence supported the entry into
Ms. Smith's house. (See R., pp.226-27, 290.) The district court determined: "Based upon the
information known to the officers at the time they secured the home, an exigency existed to
preserve evidence of a serious crime. No exigency existed with regard to persons in need of
medical attention, however." (R., p.294.) According to the district court, the officers' decision
to seek a consensual search, and to seal the scene in the event of a refusal was reasonable, in

1

Although the motion to suppress also asserted a violation of Ms. Smith's rights under
Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution (see R., pp.159-62), no specific argument was made
asserting the Idaho Constitution. Thus, Ms. Smith will rely upon Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in this appeal.
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light of the concern that Ms. Smith could be destroying evidence in the time it would take to get
a warrant. (R., p.293.) The district court also determined the officers had reason to believe other
persons besides Ms. Duke might be in the house, and that they might be armed and dangerous.
(R., p.293.) Further, the district court determined that when Ms. Duke reentered the house after

being told it had been seized, the officers had reason to escort her and conduct a protective sweep
for officer safety. (R., p.293.)
The district court determined the officers discovered Mr. Davis' body in the plastic bag in
plain view during the protective sweep. (R., p.295.) Additionally, the district court determined
the body would inevitably have been discovered when the search warrant was issued.
R., p.295.)

(See

Per the district court, even without the evidence from the warrantless entry, the

warrant was still based on sufficient probable cause. (See R., p.296.) Thus, the district court
determined, "even if the officers' warrantless entry into Smith's home had been illegal ... the
evidence seized pursuant to the Warrant would inevitably have been discovered." (R., p.298.)
Ms. Smith exercised her right to a jury trial. (See R., pp.525-50.) During the trial, the
State sought to introduce into evidence Trial Exhibit 4, which contained body camera footage
depicting Ms. Smith's repeated refusals to allow the officers to enter her house. (See Tr., p.494,
L.23 - p.495, L.13.) Ms. Smith objected to the admission of Trial Exhibit 4 on the basis the
State would not be able to lay sufficient foundation to play the recording. (Tr., p.492, Ls.17-25,
p.495, Ls.5-8.)

The district court overruled the objection, provided the State established

foundation for the video itself. (Tr., p.496, Ls.12-13.) When the State moved for the admission
of Trial Exhibit 4, the district court overruled Ms. Smith's renewed foundational objection,
finding that foundation for admission of the exhibit had been established. (See Tr., p.519, Ls.821.)
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During her direct examination at trial, Ms. Smith confirmed she had met Mr. Davis at the
Fort Hall Casino early on the day of the shooting. (See Tr., p.1591, Ls.3-8.) Later that day, she
met Mr. Day and they both went back to her house. (See Tr., p.1611, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Davis
arrived later and Ms. Smith, who was inside, heard gunshots. (See Tr., p.1612, Ls.3-8.) When
she came outside, she saw that Mr. Day had shot Mr. Davis in the legs. (See Tr., p.1613, L.13 p.1614, L.15.) Ms. Smith told Mr. Day to leave and then helped Mr. Davis into her house, where
she bandaged his leg wounds, using tobacco to stop the bleeding.

(See Tr., p.1614, L.16 -

p.1616, L.5; see also Trial Ex. 234, p.2 (autopsy report confirming Mr. Davis' leg wounds had
been plugged with tobacco and bandaged).) She stated did not have a phone to call 911, and did
not know if Mr. Davis had a phone. (See Tr., p.1616, Ls.8-11.)
Ms. Smith testified that, after she stopped the bleeding, Mr. Davis asked her to wait five
minutes and then take him to the hospital. (See Tr., p .1616, L. 6 - p .161 7, L. 6.) She testified she
laid down next to the couch when she heard another gunshot and saw that Mr. Day had returned
and shot Mr. Davis in the head. (See Tr., p.1617, L. 7 - p.1618, L.10.)
Ms. Smith testified she did not go to the police because she was scared and thought
Mr. Day might come back again and shoot her as well. (See Tr., p.1620, Ls.8-12.) She was not
strong enough to move the body on her town, so she elicited Mr. Lopez's help. (See Tr., p.1620,
L.2 - p.1621, L.21.) Mr. Lopez helped her move the body and wrap it. (See Tr., p.1621, Ls.321.) He then helped her clean parts of the house. (See Tr., p.1622, Ls.5-15.) Ms. Smith further
testified that the police took photographs of her body, and there were no bruises on her from a
gun like a .45-70, which kicked "like a mule." (See Tr., p.1633, L.14-p.1634, L.1.)
For his part, Mr. Day agreed to plead guilty to aggravated battery with use of deadly
weapon, in exchange for his testimony against Ms. Smith. (See Tr., p.1421, L.7 - p.1426, L.6.)
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He testified he had lived with Mr. Davis for a time. (See Tr., p.1426, L.23 - p.1427, L.9.)
According to Mr. Day, before they were evicted from their shared residence, Mr. Davis would
bring drug friends into the house, sell drugs, and steal things. (See Tr., p.1429, L.17 - p.1430,
L.2.) Mr. Davis also would not pay rent, and when Mr. Day asked him for the rent one night
before going to bed, he awoke to Mr. Davis punching him in the face. (See Tr., 1430, Ls.3-5,
p.1442, Ls.3-10.)
Mr. Day testified he was outside Ms. Smith's house with his dog, and had just fired
Ms. Smith's .22 gun to clear it when Mr. Davis drove up. (Tr., p.1470, L.17 -p.1471, L.10.) He
did not know Mr. Davis would be coming to Ms. Smith's house. (See Tr., p.1471, L.24 p.1472, L.4.) Mr. Day testified that Mr. Davis got out of his car, ran around the front of the car,
and called Mr. Day's name.

(Tr., p.1476, Ls.17-19.) He then shot Mr. Davis in the legs.

(Tr., p.1476, Ls.19-23.) Mr. Day testified that he felt threatened by Mr. Davis, and so shot him
in the legs to prevent Mr. Davis from hurting him or his dog. (Tr., p.1476, L.24 - p.1477, L.8,
p.1483, Ls.5-17.) He testified Ms. Smith then came out screaming and telling her mother that he
had shot Mr. Davis, Mr. Day gave the gun back to Ms. Smith, and he got in his car with his dog
and left. (Tr., p.1479, Ls.I-I 7, p.1480, Ls.5-11.)
After she was arrested, Ms. Smith reported in jail telephone calls to a friend that
Ms. Duke was actually the one who shot Mr. Davis. (See Trial Exs. 246 to 249.) Ms. Smith
testified that she said that because someone had threatened her and her family and she did not
want anyone else to get hurt. (Tr., p.1632, Ls.14-23.) She testified Ms. Duke could not have
done it because Ms. Duke could not hold or fire a gun. (Tr., p.1632, Ls.24-25.)
For her part, Ms. Duke denied shooting Mr. Davis. (Tr., p.1256, Ls.7-23.) Rather, she
testified that she was in her bedroom at Ms. Smith's house talking with Ms. Smith when she
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heard two shots that she believed came from a .22, and then she heard Mr. Day's car leave the
driveway. (See Tr., p.1238, L.1 - p.1241, L.24, p.1242, Ls.14-20, p.1249, L.22 - p.1250, L.2.)
According to Ms. Duke, Ms. Smith then came back to her room to get some scissors so she could
bandage Mr. Davis' injuries. (See Tr., p.1245, Ls.18-23.) Ms. Duke did not leave her bedroom.
(See Tr., p.1247, Ls.3-4.)

Ms. Duke testified she then heard Mr. Day's car return, followed by another gunshot.
(See Tr., p.1250, L.5 - p.1251, L.4.) She did not recall testifying previously at the preliminary

hearing that Ms. Smith came in her bedroom and told her that Mr. Davis had been put out of his
misery. 2 (See Tr., p.1251, Ls.5-11, p.1252, L.20- p.1253, L.2.) Ms. Duke testified that she was
"still in shock" when she testified at the preliminary hearing. (Tr., p.1252, L.25 - p.1253, L.7.)
She had previously testified that she heard Ms. Smith rustling plastic, but testified at the trial
that, while she had initially thought that, it had actually turned out to be one of her dogs rustling
the plastic. (Tr., p.1254, L.22 - p.1255, L.5.) Ms. Duke testified she did not see who shot
Mr. Davis. (Tr., p.1255, Ls.20-21.)
Law enforcement took Ms. Duke to the sheriffs office after searching Ms. Smith's
house, and her other daughter and her grandson, Kellie and Jeremy Leslie, subsequently picked
her up and took her to Boise. (See Tr., p.1274, L.22 - p.1275, L.8.) Ms. Duke testified she did
not remember talking to the Leslies at all about what happened, nor did she remember telling
them that Ms. Smith shot Mr. Davis. (Tr., p.1275, L.19-p.1276, L.11.)

2

Later in her testimony, after the State asked her, "so right after Melonie told you that they 'put
the son of a bitch out of his misery,' what happened next," Ms. Duke answered, "She left the
room." (See Tr., p.1255, Ls.6-9.) When the State asked her, "Melonie told you 'We put the son
of a bitch out of his misery'; right," she replied, "Yes." (See Tr., p.1255, Ls.22-24.)
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However, Ms. Leslie testified that, on their trip to Boise, Ms. Duke had made statements
about what had occurred. (See Tr., p.1295, Ls.8-10.) When the State asked, "And what was it
she was talking to you about," Ms. Smith objected on the basis of hearsay. (Tr., p.1295, Ls.1113.) The district court overruled the hearsay objection without further explanation. (Tr., p.1295,
L.14.) Ms. Leslie then testified that Ms. Duke had stated that Mr. Day and Ms. Smith had shot
Mr. Davis.

(Tr., p.1295, L.15 - p.1296, L.1.) Ms. Leslie also testified Ms. Duke told her

Ms. Smith put alcohol in his wounds before she shot him in the head, and she later wrapped the
body in plastic. (Tr., p.1296, Ls.4-15.) Ms. Leslie testified that Ms. Duke related that Mr. Davis
was crying, and that Ms. Smith had said something about putting him out of his misery like an
animal. (Tr., p.1297, Ls.3-10.)
Jeremy Leslie similarly testified that Ms. Duke had talked about what happened during
the drive to Boise. (See Tr., p.1302, Ls.21-25.) The State asked him, "And what did she indicate
had occurred," and Ms. Smith again objected on the basis of hearsay. (Tr., p.1303, Ls.1-3.)
Again, the district court overruled the hearsay objection without further explanation.
(Tr., p.1303, L.4.) Jeremy Leslie then testified Ms. Duke stated somebody had been killed in
their house, and that she did not see anything, but had heard the gunshots. (Tr., p.1303, Ls.7-11.)
He did not remember anything specifically about what Ms. Duke had heard from Ms. Smith, or
about putting the individual out of his misery like you would an animal. (Tr., p.1304, Ls.1-8.)
Other witnesses also testified that Ms. Smith had told them she had shot somebody. (See
Tr., p.1316, L.13 - p.1318, L.2, p.1370, L.3 - p.1373, L.4.)

For example, Mr. Lopez testified

that when Ms. Smith told him she had shot Mr. Davis, she stated she had done it as a favor, like
putting down an animal. (See Tr., p.1538, L.7 - p.1540, L.5.)

9

During closing arguments, the prosecutor used Ms. Smith’s repeated refusals to consent
to the search of her house to impeach her version of events, and argued the jury should infer her
guilt from them:
Now, if we take the defendant’s version and the defendant’s version today
[sic]—I don’t want to tell you how to consider what she’s said, but I want to point
out those inconsistencies that she’s had.
When law enforcement arrived at her residence . . . she told them that
Kevin had shot David Davis in the legs and that he had left. No one was hurt
there. No body was there. Nothing happened inside the residence. They just
needed to leave and go about their business.
That’s what she wanted them to do, because she had something to hide.
She preferred that’s what they would do, because she had something to hide. She
had the body of David Davis to hide . . . .
(Tr., p.1721, L.22 – p.1722, L.11.) Over the course of the jury deliberations, the jury specifically
asked to review Trial Exhibit 4, the only exhibit among the almost 250 exhibits they asked to
review. (See R., p.465.)
The jury found Ms. Smith guilty as charged. (R., pp.520-21.) The district court imposed
a unified sentence of fixed life imprisonment for murder, and a concurrent unified sentence of
five years, with one year fixed, for destruction of evidence. (R., pp.569-72.) Ms. Smith filed a
Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.575-77.)
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ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred when it denied Ms. Smith's motion to suppress because
the exigent circumstances and protective sweep exceptions do not justify the warrantless
search of her house after officers froze the scene, and the inevitable discovery doctrine
does not prevent the suppression of the evidence gained from that unlawful search.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing the Leslies' hearsay
testimony to be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.

III.

Whether several of Ms. Smith's rights were violated, amounting to fundamental error,
when a video showing her repeatedly refusing to consent to a search of her house was
admitted at trial and the prosecutor argued the jurors should infer her guilt based on
those refusals.

IV.

Whether, even if the above preserved errors are individually harmless, Ms. Smith's
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated because the
accumulation of errors deprived her of her right to a fair trial.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Smith's Motion To Suppress Because The Exigent
Circumstances And Protective Sweep Exceptions Do Not Justify The Warrantless Search Of Her
House After Officers Froze The Scene, And The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Does Not
Prevent The Suppression Of The Evidence Gained From That Unlawful Search

A.

Standard Of Review And Relevant Law
"The standard ofreview of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Page, 140 Idaho

841, 843 (2004). "When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches and seizures
are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless they come within one of
the established exceptions to the warrant requirement. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580
(1991); State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 295 (1988). "[O]nce the search is shown to have
been made without a warrant, the search is deemed to be per se unreasonable, and the burden
shifts to the state to show that the search was pursuant to one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement."

State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 92 ( 1981) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted).
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B.

The District Court Erroneously Determined The Exigent Circumstance Exception
Justified The Warrantless Intrusion Because, Once The Officers Detained Ms. Smith,
Any Reasonable Fear Of Imminent Destruction Of Evidence Was Gone
The exigent circumstances exception is one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant

requirement. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485 (2007). "The exception applies where the facts
known at the time of the entry indicate a 'compelling need for official action and no time to
secure a warrant."' Id. at 485-86 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)). "The
exigent circumstances exception refers broadly to fact patterns sufficient to excuse an officer
from the requirement of obtaining a warrant to conduct a search for which he has probable
cause." State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 504 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
One circumstance that has been held to constitute an exigency is the removal or
destruction of evidence. Id. However, "[i]n determining whether the officers reasonably feared
imminent destruction of evidence, the appropriate inquiry is whether the facts, as they appeared
at the precise moment in question, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer to believe that
evidence might be destroyed before a warrant could be secured." Id.
Moreover, "a warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justify its initiation."' Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968)). "[T]he physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328-29 (2001),
even after the officers had been told the defendant had drugs inside his house, the officers only
told the defendant he could not reenter the house unaccompanied. The few times the defendant
went back inside, an officer stood just outside the door and observed the defendant. Id. at 329.

13

Those actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The United States

Supreme Court in McArthur held “the restraint at issue was tailored” to the urgent law
enforcement need, as it was “limited in time and scope, and avoid[ed] significant intrusion into
the home itself.” Id. at 331 (citations omitted). The Court explained the officers “had good
reason to fear that, unless restrained, McArthur would destroy the drugs before they could return
with a warrant.” Id. at 332. However, “the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law
enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy.” Id. Specifically: “They neither
searched the trailer nor arrested McArthur before obtaining a warrant. Rather, they imposed a
significantly less restrictive restraint, preventing McArthur only from entering the trailer
unaccompanied.

They left his home and his belongings intact—until a neutral Magistrate,

finding probable cause, issued a warrant.” Id.
The intrusion into Ms. Smith’s house was nowhere near so narrowly tailored to the need
to preserve evidence. Notably, unlike the officers in McArthur, the officers detained Ms. Smith
outside her house. However, once they did that, any reasonable fear that she could immediately
destroy evidence was gone. Moreover, the fact that Ms. Duke was still inside the house, without
more, was not sufficient to create a reasonable fear of imminent destruction of evidence. See
Stackhouse v. State, 468 A.2d 333, 342 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (“The law is settled that the mere
presence of third persons does not create exigent circumstances that justified a warrantless
search. The argument was rejected in both Chimel v. California, [395 U.S. 752 (1969)], and
Vale v. Louisiana, [399 U.S. 30 (1970)], where it was urged in dissent. Such a rule would
eliminate the fourth amendment protection for all occupants of a home whenever an arrestee
lived in a home with family or others.”). This is particularly true given Ms. Duke’s physical
condition—too shaky to stand in the doorway—and the fact that Mr. Lopez had not told the
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officers that Ms. Duke was involved in the other attempts to clean up the scene. (See R., pp.26872, 280.) As such, the officers had no basis to believe Ms. Duke presented an imminent threat to
the evidence believe to be inside.
Even if Ms. Duke had presented an imminent threat of destruction of evidence, the
officers' search of the house went far beyond what that exigency would have justified. See

Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393. To tailor the intrusion into Ms. Smith's house to law enforcement's
need to preserve evidence, the officers here should have followed the example of the officer in

McArthur, and stood just inside the door of the house to observe Ms. Duke, to be sure she did not
tamper with any potential evidence. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 329. Alternatively, the officers
could have followed the suggestion of defense counsel, and removed Ms. Duke from the house
while she was standing in the doorway, as they had already done with Ms. Smith.

(See

Tr., p.162, Ls.23-24 ("But once they had both of those ladies removed from the house, there's no
more destruction of evidence.").)
In either event, the exigent circumstances exception did not justify the officers'
warrantless intrusion into Ms. Smith's house. Once the officers detained Ms. Smith outside the
house, any reasonable fear of imminent destruction of evidence was gone.

C.

The Protective Sweep Exception Did Not Justify The Officers' Warrantless Search
Through Ms. Smith's House Because The Officers Did Not Have Reasonable,
Articulable Suspicion That The House Harbored An Individual Posing A Danger
The protective sweep exception is a separate recognized exception to the warrant

requirement. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). Under that exception, "following the
in-home arrest of a suspect, the police could conduct a protective sweep of the premises provided
that they had a reasonable, articulable suspicion 'that the area to be swept harbors an individual
posing a danger to those on the arrest scene."' State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 776 (1999)
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(quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 334). The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard for a protective
sweep requires “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those
facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors
an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. The
protective sweep exception may apply where a suspect is detained rather than formally arrested
at the time of the protective sweep. See Revenaugh, 133 Idaho at 777. The exception also
“applies when the suspect is arrested/detained outside the residence, provided that the officers
have the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support the sweep.” Id. at 778.
The district court determined this exception was applicable because “the officers had
reason to believe that other persons besides Bettie might be in the house and that they might be
armed and dangerous,” the officers knew that Ms. Smith and Mr. Day had allegedly shot
Mr. Davis on the premises, Mr. Lopez reported guns were in the house, and five vehicles were
parked in the driveway.

(See R., p.293.)

The district court also noted the officers had

information regarding drug use and production on the scene. (See R., p.293.) However, these
facts do not rise to the level of reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house was harboring an
individual posing a danger to those on scene at the time the officers detained Ms. Smith.
Importantly, the facts taken together here show that Mr. Lopez had told the officers
“Kevin” had shot Mr. Davis two days before Mr. Lopez met with the officers, and he did not
indicate Mr. Day had returned to the scene. (See R., pp.269, 271.) Additionally, Mr. Lopez did
not suggest anyone besides himself had been at the house to help Ms. Smith with the body or
with cleanup. (See R., pp.269-73.) Mr. Lopez told the officers Ms. Smith kept multiple vehicles
in the driveway, and given that two people lived in the house and people in rural areas often own
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multiple vehicles, 3 the fact that there were five vehicles in the driveway did not support a
suspicion that anyone besides Ms. Smith and Ms. Duke were in the house. Even the reports of
drug use and production on the premises do not indicate that anyone else was actually present at
that time, late in the evening.

Further, officers had been surveilling the scene prior to the

detention of Ms. Smith, and did not report anyone coming or going during that time.
Thus, the facts taken together show the officers did not have the requisite reasonable,
articulable suspicion necessary to justify the officers' warrantless search throughout Ms. Smith's
house as a protective sweep. See Revenaugh, 133 Idaho at 776-78.

D.

The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Does Not Apply To Prevent The Suppression Of The
Evidence Gained From The Unlawful Search Of Ms. Smith's House Because The Search
Warrant Was Based In Part On Information Obtained During The Unlawful Search
Evidence obtained in violation of the United States and Idaho constitutional protections

against unreasonable searches generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the
illegal government action. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 515-19 (2012); State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009). This exclusionary rule "applies to evidence obtained directly from the
illegal government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original
illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, there are
various exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the inevitable discovery doctrine. See

State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017).

3

See Piyushimita (Vonu) Thakuriah & Yihua Liao, Analysis of Variations in Vehicle Ownership
Expenditures, Transp. Res. Rec.: J. of the Transp. Res. Bd., No. 1926, 2005, at 7, available at
https://www.academia.edu/2941850/Analysis_of_variations_in_vehicle_ownership_expenditures
("[T]he average number of vehicles owned by all rural households is about 2.90, whereas the
average is about 2.4 for urban households.").
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“[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine asks courts to engage in a hypothetical finding into
the lawful actions law enforcement would have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful
avenue that led to the evidence.” State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31 (2017) (citing Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,
497 (2001)) (emphasis in original). “The premise is that law enforcement should be ‘in the
same, not a worse, position that they would have been’ absent the misconduct.” Id. (quoting Nix,
467 U.S. at 443 (majority opinion)).

However, “[t]he doctrine must presuppose inevitable

hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions, not in series flowing directly from the
officers’ unlawful conduct.” Id. at 32. Thus, the inevitable discovery doctrine “‘is not intended
to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by substituting what the police should have done for
what they really did.’” Id. (quoting State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 (Ct. App. 1985)).
Despite acknowledging these principles, the district court did not correctly apply them to
this case. (See R., p.289.) The inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to Ms. Smith’s house
because the search warrant was not obtained through inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel
to the illegal actions.
Instead, the warrant was obtained in series flowing directly from the officers’ unlawful
search, as evidenced by the facts that the officers did not seek a search warrant until after the
unlawful entry, and they included details gleaned from the unlawful entry in the search warrant
application. (See Motion to Suppress Hearing State’s Ex. 10 (hereinafter, Ex. 10), pp.3-4.) The
Statement of Facts in Support of Probable Cause from the Affidavit of Probable Cause stated that
when the officers entered the house, they “could see what appeared to be a body wrapped in
plastic, consistent with the description provided by Guy Lopez.” (Ex. 10, p.4.) That statement
of facts also related that Ms. Duke “further informed law enforcement at the time that David
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Davis was shot three days ago by Kevin." (Ex. 10, p.4.) The police here did not secure a search
warrant while other officers staked out Ms. Smith's house, as an inevitable hypothetical running
in parallel of the unlawful conduct.
Thus, the district court's determination that "abundant probable cause (other than
information received from inside Smith's home) supported the Warrant" (R., p.298), is precisely
the sort of analysis rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in Downing, because it substituted what
the officers should have for what they actually did. The inevitable discovery doctrine does not
apply to prevent the suppression of the evidence gained from the unlawful search of Ms. Smith's
house because the search warrant was based in part on information obtained during the
unlawful search. The district court's decision to deny Ms. Smith's motion to suppress should be
reversed, because that evidence was discovered pursuant to an unlawful, warrantless search of
her house.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The Leslies' Hearsay Testimony To Be
Admitted For The Truth Of The Matter Asserted

A.

Standard Of Review
The district court's decision of whether to admit statements under the hearsay rules is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 867 (Ct. App. 2000). The
district court abuses its discretion when it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion, when it
acts beyond the outer bounds of its discretion, when it does not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards, or when it does not reach its decision in an exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).
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B.

The Applicable Legal Standards Make It Clear Extrinsic Evidence Of Prior Inconsistent
Statements Which Were Made Out Of Court Cannot Be Admitted For The Truth Of The
Matter Asserted, But The District Court's Decision Allowed Precisely That In This Case
Hearsay is a statement which the declarant did not make while testifying at the current

trial, and which is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. I.RE. 801(c). As such, prior
inconsistent statements are, by definition, hearsay. The only exception for prior inconsistent
statements is that they will not qualify as hearsay under the rule if that statement was, itself,
"given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition."
I.R.E. 801(d)(l)(A); State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 74 (2011). Absent that, such statements
can only be used to impeach the witness-declarant under I.R.E. 613 since the hearsay rules
prevent them from being used for the truth of the matter asserted therein. State v. Koch, 157
Idaho 89, 103 (2014) ("Idaho Rule of Evidence 613 allows the use of prior inconsistent
out-of-court statements to impeach a witness. These statements are not hearsay because they are
not offered for the truth of any facts asserted, but rather, solely to impeach the credibility of the
witness.") (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added); accord State v. Hooper, 138 Idaho 414,
420 (Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that the "sole evidentiary purpose" for statements admitted
under I.R.E. 613(b) "is to impeach [the declarant's] credibility").
In this case, Bettie Duke denied several assertions during her testimony. For example,
she testified she did not recall Ms. Smith telling her that Mr. Davis "was put out of his misery." 4
(Tr., p.1251, Ls.5-11.) She also denied that she heard Ms. Smith rustling some plastic after
hearing the gunshots, testifying instead that, while she had initially thought it had been

4

An assertion that the witness does not remember making a statement is equivalent to denying
that they made the statement. Preuss v. Thomson, 112 Idaho 169, 171 (Ct. App. 1986); see
State v. Folk, 162 Idaho 620, 629 (2017) (favorably citing Preuss in regard to its discussion of
I.RE. 613).
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Ms. Smith, it actually turned out to be one of their dogs. (Tr., p.1254, L.22 - p.1255, L.5.) She
also denied that she had talked to the Leslies about what happened on the night in question.
(Tr., p.1275, L.19 - p.1276, L.12, p.1288, L.20 - p.1289, L.11.)
The prosecutor then presented testimony from both Kellie and Jeremy Leslie to contradict
Ms. Duke's denials. For example, both contradicted her assertion that she had not talked to them
about what happened, and they gave specific examples of things Ms. Duke had told them about
the incident.

(Tr., p.1295, L.8 - p.1297, L.14 (Ms. Leslie's testimony in that regard);

Tr., p.1302, L.24 - p.1303, L.25, p.1304, L.25 - p.1305, L.5 (Mr. Leslie's testimony in that
regard).) In fact, Ms. Leslie offered testimony about statements Ms. Duke had made which
specifically contradicted her trial testimony-that Ms. Duke had said Ms. Smith had shot
Mr. Davis in the head (Tr., p.1295, L.25 - p.1296, L.8); that Ms. Duke had said Ms. Smith
wrapped Mr. Davis' body up in plastic (Tr., p.1296, Ls.10-12); and that Ms. Duke had said that
Ms. Smith had said "she put them out of his misery." 5 (Tr., p.1297, Ls.5-14.) Since none of
Ms. Duke's statements to either of the Leslies were made under oath, they could not be admitted
for the truth of the matter asserted under I.R.E. 801(d)(l)(A). See Koch, 157 Idaho at 103.
Nevertheless, the district court overruled Ms. Smith's hearsay objections to both the Leslies'
testimony. (Tr., p.1295, Ls.12-14, p.1303, Ls.2-4.) In other words, the district court was ruling
that the hearsay rules did not prevent either of the Leslies' testimony from being admitted for the
truth of the matter asserted. See I.R.E. 801 (c)(2). As such, the district court abused its discretion
by not acting consistently with the applicable legal standards.

5

The prosecutor asked Mr. Leslie about these specific statements as well, but he testified he
could not remember the specifics of the conversation. (Tr., p.1304, Ls.1-24.)
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That error is particularly troubling since, in light of the district court's ruling, the
prosecutor in closing actually did argue the Leslies' testimony for the truth of the matters
asserted therein: "But then you also heard from the Leslies-Kellie Leslie and Jeremy Lesliewho both were present while giving Bettie Duke a ride back to Boise, and Bettie told them that
Melonie had shot David in the head. So we have that specific version that the Defendant would

like to not have been the result, but ultimately, based on the evidence, it is." (Tr., p.1724,
Ls.11-18 (emphasis added).)

Therefore, this Court should vacate Ms. Smith's conviction

because of the district court's erroneous decision to admit the Leslies' hearsay testimony for the
truth of the matters asserted therein.

III.
Several Of Ms. Smith's Rights Were Violated, Amounting To Fundamental Error, When A
Video Showing Her Repeatedly Refusing To Consent To A Search Of Her House Was Admitted
At Trial And The Prosecutor Argued The Jurors Should Infer Her Guilt Based On Those
Refusals
A.

Standard Of Review
When an error is not contemporaneously objected-to, it can only be raised if it amounts to

fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). To show fundamental error, the
appellant must show a violation of an unwaived constitutional right that is clear on the face of
the record and that the violation affected the outcome of the case. Id.; accord State v. Miller,
P.3d _ , 2019 WL 1217673, at *2 (Mar. 15, 2019) (clarifying that, to be clear from the record,
the record needs to show the failure to object was not for strategic reasons, and that, to show
prejudice, the record needs to show the error actually affected the outcome, not just a reasonable
possibility that it did), petition for reh 'g filed.
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B.

The Record Clearly Shows The Prosecutor Improperly Arguing The Jurors Should Infer
Ms. Smith's Guilt From The Fact That She Exercised Her Fourth Amendment Rights,
Which Is A Violation Of Several Of Her Unwaived Constitutional Rights
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that "[t]he same rationale that precludes

evidence of an accused's assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment Rights offered for the purpose
of either impeachment or inferring guilt precludes evidence of the accused's assertion of his or
her Fourth Amendment rights offered for the same purposes." State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho
463,470 (2007); see also State v. Jeske,_ Idaho_, 436 P.3d 683, 688-89 (2019) (presuming
the presentation of a video showing the defendant refusing to consent to a blood draw constituted
an improper comment on his exercise of his Fourth Amendment rights since the State had
conceded it was so). The video of the interaction on Ms. Smith's porch (presented in Trial
Exhibit 4) shows Ms. Smith repeatedly refusing to consent to the officers' requests to search her
house because she "has rights." As such, Trial Exhibit 4 repeatedly commented on her exercise
of her Fourth Amendment rights.
Moreover, in his closing argument, the prosecutor expressly used those refusals to
impeach Ms. Smith's version of events and argued the jury should infer her guilt from them:
Now, ifwe take the defendant's version and the defendant's version today
[sic ]-I don't want to tell you how to consider what she's said, but I want to point
out those inconsistencies that she's had.
When law enforcement arrived at her residence ... she told them that
Kevin had shot David Davis in the legs and that he had left. No one was hurt
there. No body was there. Nothing happened inside the residence. They just
needed to leave and go about their business.
That's what she wanted them to do, because she had something to hide.
She preferred that's what they would do, because she had something to hide. She
had the body of David Davis to hide ....
(Tr., p.1721, L.22 -p.1722, L.11.) Therefore, the violation of Ms. Smith's Fourth Amendment
rights under Christiansen is clear from the face of the record.
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In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has actually previously found that similar conduct by
this same prosecutor constituted a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. State v.
Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 233-35 (2014). In Skunkcap, one of the investigating officers was
called to testify about his attempt to interview the defendant, but that the defendant refused to
answer his questions. Id. at 233. The Court concluded the sole purpose of that testimony was to
get the jury to conclude the defendant was guilty because he would not talk with the officer. Id.
Although the defendant did not object to that testimony, the Skunkcap Court found that it
satisfied the first two prongs of the test for fundamental error, because there, as in Ms. Smith’s
case, the attempt to use that evidence to infer the defendant’s guilt was a violation of the Fifth
Amendment clear from the face of the transcript. Id. at 233-35.
The Skunkcap Court actually found a second clear constitutional violation in that
situation—a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial due to
prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 234-35. Prosecutors are duty-bound to see that the defendant
receives a fair trial on nothing but “competent evidence.” Id. at 234. Since evidence that a
person exercised her rights is not competent evidence of guilt, the prosecutor deprives the
defendant of a fair trial by seeking to have the jury find her guilty based on that incompetent
evidence. Id.
That same violation exists in Ms. Smith’s case, and it is actually more apparent than it
was in Skunkcap. In Skunkcap, the prosecutor simply elicited the evidence and left it to the
jurors to potentially draw the impermissible inference. See id. at 233-34. In Ms. Smith’s case,
however, the prosecutor expressly argued that the jurors should draw the impermissible inference
in his closing remarks.

(Tr., p.1721, L.22 – p.1722, L.11.)

Specifically, he argued that

Ms. Smith told the officers “[t]hey just needed to leave and go about their business. That’s what
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she wanted them to do, because she had something to hide. She preferred that's what they would
do, because she had something to hide.

She had the body of David Davis to hide . . . . "

(Tr., p.1722, Ls.6-11 (emphasis added).) Therefore, just as in Skunkcap, the transcript of the
prosecutor's argument shows a clear violation of Ms. Smith's Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial, alongside the clear violation of her Fourth Amendment rights caused by introducing Trial
Exhibit 4 in the first place.

C.

The Record Affirmatively Shows The Failure To Raise The Constitutional Objections
Was Not Strategic
In Skunkcap, the Supreme Court noted such errors satisfied the second prong of the Perry

analysis because the relevant facts were clear on the face of the record and "[t]here is nothing to
indicate that defense counsel's failure to object was a tactical decision." Skunkcap, 157 Idaho at
235. The same is true in Ms. Smith's case. In fact, the record in this case affirmatively indicates
trial counsel's strategy was to get that video excluded, as trial counsel objected when the video
was proffered as an exhibit at trial. (Tr., p.519, Ls.8-15 (renewing his prior objection when the
video was proffered); see Tr., p.495, Ls.16-25 (trial counsel objecting to the video, arguing the
State could not lay proper foundation to admit it).)
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed a similar situation-where trial counsel objected on
one ground, but not the Constitutional grounds argued as fundamental error on appeal-in
State v. Easley, and it held that situation satisfies the second prong of the test for fundamental

error because:
The alleged violation is clear from the record, and additional facts are not required
for analysis. Easley' s attorney objected to the prosecutorial veto on numerous
grounds and tried very hard to get her into a mental health program. The district
court was very clear about the procedure in the Fifth Judicial District: the
prosecutor has an absolute veto over eligibility for the mental health court post-
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judgment. No additional evidence is required to establish that the court
contracted away its sentencing authority, which it cannot do.

State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221 (2014); cf Miller, 2019 WL 1217673, at *2 (requiring the
record to affirmatively show counsel was not acting strategically by not objecting). 6 The same is
true here-Ms. Smith's attorney tried to keep the video out, and no additional evidence is
required to see that the video and the prosecutor's argument based on it are improper.

Cf Easley, 156 Idaho at 221. Since the record shows the failure to object on this particular
ground was not part of a strategy to let the video be admitted, the second prong of the
fundamental error analysis is satisfied.

D.

Since The Jury Specifically Asked To Review The Evidence Which Commented On
Ms. Smith's Exercise Of Her Fourth Amendment Rights, The Record Shows That These
Errors Affected The Outcome In This Case
Of the nearly 250 exhibits admitted in this case, the jurors asked to review only one

during their deliberations-Trial Exhibit 4, with all its comments on Ms. Smith's exercise of her
Fourth Amendment rights. (R., p.547.) Thus, the record reveals that the jury actually considered
that erroneous evidence, and so, the error in this case actually affected the verdict, as the third
prong of Perry requires.

6

Ms. Smith acknowledges that, contrary to Easley, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that an
objection to evidence on one ground precludes fundamental error review on another ground
because, in such a case, the error is not "unobjected-to." State v. Diaz, 163 Idaho 165, 169-70
(Ct. App. 2017), rev. denied; State v. Briggs, 162 Idaho 736, 739 (Ct. App. 2017), rev. denied.
However, the Idaho Supreme Court's precedent controls when there is a conflict between its
precedent and the Court of Appeals' precedent. State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 272 n.1 (2013)
("[W]e simply expect lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, to follow decisions of this
Court when there is a conflict between our decisions on an issue of law and those of the Court of
Appeals."). Therefore, Ms. Smith will conform her arguments to the Supreme Court's precedent
as set forth in Easley.
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To that point, Perry explained the requirement to show the error affected the outcome “is
equivalent to the analysis applied in Chapman harmless error review,” but with the appellant
bearing the burden of persuasion. Perry, 150 Idaho at 225. Under Chapman harmless error
review, the courts evaluate whether the error “contributed to the conviction.” Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (internal quotation omitted).

Perry acknowledged the

differing articulations of the harmless error test, but explained they are “so similar analytically . .
. that there is no practical difference.” See Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. In other words, saying “the
error affected the verdict” is the same as saying “the error contributed to the verdict.”
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[t]o say that an error did not
‘contribute’ to the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of
that feature of the trial later held to be erroneous. . . . To say that an error did not contribute to
the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
considered on the issue in question, as revealed by the record.” Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403
(1991), overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991). The fact
that the jurors specifically requested to view Trial Exhibit 4 during their deliberations indicates
its contents were an important part of what they considered in reaching their verdict, which
means Trial Exhibit 4, with its improper comments on Ms. Smith’s exercise of her Fourth
Amendment rights, contributed to the verdict.
In fact, the Idaho Court of Appeals has actually held, in the context of fundamental error
review, that commenting on the defendant’s refusal to consent to a search is an important fact
within the fabric of the evidence because the jurors will consider such evidence when assessing
the defendant’s mindset and credibility. State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 641 (Ct. App.
2011). In Betancourt, officers conducted an inventory search on a car which the defendant had
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been the last to drive. Id. at 641. They found drugs under the floor mat on the side of the car
where the defendant had been sleeping. Id. at 636-37 (the defendant had been awakened by gun
shots, and as a result, moved into the driver’s seat and drove away). His behavior during the
traffic stop had been unusual and evasive, and his blood ultimately tested positive for
methamphetamine. Id. at 641. Despite all that evidence which indicated he knew the drugs were
in the car, the Court of Appeals still found the improper evidence commenting on his refusal to
consent to a search of the car was an important fact, if not the most important fact, within the
fabric of the evidence considered regarding the knowledge element at issue in that case. Id.
Therefore, it held the erroneous admission of that evidence affected the outcome, and thus,
amounted to reversible fundamental error. Id.
Here, too, the evidence of Ms. Smith’s repeated refusals to consent to a search of her
house was an important fact within the fabric of everything the jurors considered. The critical
question before the jury in this case was who had pulled the trigger—Ms. Smith or Kevin Day.
As such, the critical question before the jury was one of credibility—did they believe
Ms. Smith’s version of events, or did they believe the State’s version of events. The prosecutor
specifically asked the jurors to reject Ms. Smith’s version of events, to find her not credible, by
drawing the very inference that Betancourt explained made such evidence important to the
outcome. See Betancourt, 151 Idaho at 641; cf. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho at 235 (concluding the
errors in that case did not contribute to the verdict because of the other evidence presented there).
As such, the prosecutor’s misconduct actually makes it clear that the comments on Ms. Smith’s
exercise of her Fourth Amendment rights were important facts within the fabric of everything the
jurors would be considering on the central question before them. The fact that the jurors then
asked to see that specific piece of evidence reinforces that it was actually important within the
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fabric of their deliberations. Therefore, the record in this case actually shows the clear violations
of Ms. Smith's Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights contributed to, and as such, affected, the
verdict in this case.
As a result, this Court should vacate Ms. Smith's conviction because of these
fundamental errors infringing on several of her Constitutional rights.

IV.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Ms. Smith's Fourteenth Amendment Right
To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived Her Of
Her Right To A Fair Trial
Ms. Smith asserts that even if the Court finds that the preserved errors discussed above
were individually harmless, the district court's errors combined are not. "The cumulative error
doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless,
but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's
constitutional right to due process." State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). In
order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that there is merit to more than one
of the alleged errors and then conclude that these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant
a fair trial. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Under that doctrine, even
when individual errors are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a
defendant of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994). However, a finding of
cumulative error must be predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors. State v. Medina, 128
Idaho 19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996).
Ms. Smith asserts that the preserved errors in this case amounted to actual errors, and the
cumulative effect of those errors-the presentation of unlawfully discovered evidence and the
use of the Leslies' hearsay testimony as proof of the matters asserted-deprived her of a fair
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trial. Her arguments in this regard are found in sections LB through D and II.B above, and need
not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by reference.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction, reverse
the district court's order denying her motion to suppress, and remand her case for further
proceedings. Alternatively, Ms. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment
of conviction and remand her case for a new trial.
DATED this 19th day of April, 2019.
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